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THE FUZZY LOGIC OF FEDERALISM
Deborah Jones Merritt*
I agree with much of Professor Nagel's paper, including his
astute closing comment that those who perceive great changes in
the Supreme Court's United States v. Lopez' opinion "are looking
for the future in the wrong place."2 I want to focus on the tension
Professor Nagel identifies between the constitutional theory of a
limited central government and the reality of enumerated powers
capable of encompassing all behavior. I agree that this tension is
central to both Lopez and the Court's Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, but I want to suggest a new way of characterizing that
stress. In recasting the Commerce Clause dilemma, I will draw
upon a contemporary theory of mathematical sets called fuzzy
logic
Conventional, boolean logic divides the world into sharply
bounded sets. This lectern is furniture; my eyeglasses are not furni-
ture. I am a professor; that student is not a professor. Ordering a
pair of moccasins from the L.L. Bean catalogue is interstate com-
merce; wearing those moccasins at home is not interstate com-
merce.
Tutored in boolean logic, which lawyers adore, we approach
the Commerce Clause confidently-expecting to find a crisply
defined set of activities that constitute "Commerce ... among the
* John Deaver Drinko/Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University.
B.A. 1977, Harvard University; J.D. 1980, Columbia University. I thank James J. Brudney
and Andrew L. Merritt for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CAsE W. RFS. L. REV. 643, 661
(1996).
3. For further discussion of both fuzzy logic and the application of that theory to
Commerce Clause issues, see Deborah J. Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674
(1995). Three sources provide an excellent introduction to fuzzy logic for
nonmathematicians: BART KOSKO, Fuzzy THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF FUZZY LOGIC
(1993); DANIEL McNEnIL & PAUL FREIBERGER, FUZZY LoGic (1993); Bart Kosko &
Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic, Sct. AM., July 1993, at 76.
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several States."4 Instead, as Professor Nagel tells us, we find a
mess.' Everything, it turns out, is commerce among the states.
Even wearing moccasins in the privacy of my own home is inter-
state commerce. Wearing moccasins, after all, is related to the
demand for moccasins-and we know from Wickard v. Filburn6
that even small adjustments in consumer demand affect interstate
commerce So couldn't Congress pass a law forbidding individuals
from wearing any pair of moccasins for more than six months?
That would enhance demand for moccasins and increase interstate
sales by L.L. Bean.
At this point, we may be tempted to think that the problem
lies in the word "commerce." Maybe the Framers just picked a
poor word, a chameleon word that was capable of too many mean-
ings. Imagine for a moment that we gave Congress the power to
regulate "furniture" instead of "commerce." Would that solve the
problem of enumerated powers by restricting Congress to a well-
defined set of regulations?
Under a furniture power, Congress might begin by regulating
chairs and tables; those things surely are furniture. But we could
also make a case for regulating mirrors and picture frames, and
even bathtubs and kitchen faucets. A sink might be "furniture," and
a faucet is part of a sink, so surely it is "furniture" too.' And if
Congress were really going to control furniture, it would have to
regulate things that are stored in or on top of furniture as well.
When I put my eyeglasses on top of my desk, I sometimes scratch
the surface of the desk. So now Congress can regulate my eye-
glasses in order to preserve its plenary power over furniture.9 And
I'm quite confident that Congress could regulate marriage pursuant
to a furniture power, because when people get married they buy a
lot of furniture. Encouraging marriage stimulates the production and
purchase of furniture.'0 Pretty soon, as with our interpretation of
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. Nagel, supra note 2, at 649.
6. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
7. See id. at 124-29.
8. See Gregg Oden, Fuzziness in Semantic Memory: Choosing Exemplars of Subjective
Categories, 5 MEMORY & COGNITION 198, 201 (1977) (describing an experiment in which
subjects rated the extent to which chairs, mirrors, pictures, bathtubs, and other objects
were "furniture").
9. Cf. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (noting that the Court in Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971), held that Congress may regulate destruction of aircraft or other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce).
10. Cf. William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amend-
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the word "commerce," Congress can regulate everything under the
sun pursuant to a furniture power.
With a little creativity, in other words, every linguistic catego-
ry is infinitely expandable. Constitutional law professors used to
challenge students to think of some law that Congress couldn't
pass under the Commerce Clause. Lopez has ended that bit of
academic fun. I encourage law professors now to see if their stu-
dents can draft some enumerated power that the Supreme Court
couldn't eventually construe to confer plenary power on Congress.
In sum, the word "commerce" doesn't create our difficulties in
interpreting the Commerce Clause; the expectations of boolean
logic produce those problems. We expect words to express sharp
boundaries and are disappointed when they do not."
Fuzzy logic recognizes that most sets, including linguistic sets,
do not have clearly marked borders. Many objects belong partly to
a class and partly outside that class. Rather than classifying objects
as belonging to a set or its complement, fuzzy logic focuses on the
degree to which an object belongs in a set. 2 A fuzzy logician
would say the following: chairs and tables are very much like
furniture, they are near the center of that set; a picture frame is
somewhat like furniture, but further from the center of that phe-
nomenon; and a bathtub is only a little bit like furniture. Eyeglass-
es and marriage are hardly furniture at all, although even they can
claim a small degree of membership in the set-especially if you
have been to law school and learned to think like the Supreme
Court.
Fuzzy logic is just as natural to our thought processes as
boolean logic. In fact, psychologists find that subjects are quite
comfortable taking a list of objects and ranking the degree to
which they belong to a set.'3 These rankings also show a high
ment: Adrift in the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE LJ. 769, 783-88 (proposing a mock
national act regulating marriage and divorce for all people working for businesses engaged
in interstate commerce).
11. The Supreme Court occasionally recognizes the ambiguities inherent in the phrase
"Commerce . . . among the several States," but seems mildly apologetic about that uncer-
tainty. See, e.g., Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 ("These are not precise formulations, and in
the nature of things they cannot be."); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 123 n.24 (1942)
("Tihe criterion is necessarily one of degree and must be so defined. This does not satis-
fy those who seek for mathematical or rigid formulas").
12. McNEiLL & FREIBERGER, supra note 3, at 84-85.
13. See, e.g., Oden, supra note 8, at 201; Eleanor H. Rosch, On the Internal Structure
of Perceptual and Semantic Categories, in COGNmvE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ACQUISI-
1ON OF LANGUAGE Ill (Timothy E. Moore ed., 1973), discussed in McNEILL &
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degree of consistency. We all agree that a chair is more furniture-
like than a filing cabinet is; an apple is more of a fruit than an
olive is; and a carrot is more vegetable-like than parsley or a pick-
le.14 We all think this way; we just haven't realized that fuzzy
logic is a useful way to think-an approach that can help us solve
problems.1
Now, how can this fuzzy logic help us solve the Commerce
Clause dilemma that Professor Nagel identified? Fuzzy logic teach-
es us that we should stop asking, as the Supreme Court often has,
"is this conduct 'commerce'?" and "does the category of
'commerce' have any end?" Instead we should ask, "how much is
this conduct like commerce?" and "how much like commerce must
conduct be before Congress can regulate it?"' 6
Phrasing the questions that way is somewhat scary, because it
admits that the Supreme Court plays an active role in interpreting
the Constitution. The Court is not simply enforcing a boundary
called "commerce" that was drawn more than two hundred years
ago. As scholars from many schools of thought have taught us,
however, we can't pretend that the Constitution's text yields precise
FREIBERGER, supra note 3, at 84-85.
14. Rosch, supra note 13, at 111; see also Oden, supra note 8, at 201.
15. For engineers, fuzzy logic has proved remarkably fruitful in solving problems.
Fuzzy logic has enabled engineers to design subway trains that start and stop more
smoothly than trains driven by a human conductor, washing machines that automatically
adjust the wash cycle to the dirtiness of the clothes, cameras that compensate for hand
jitters, and a host of other consumer products. See McNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note
3, at 156; Kosko & Isaka, supra note 3, at 78-80.
16. The Lopez majority moved between these two types of analysis. The Court began
by quoting Chief Justice Marshall's famous definition of "commerce," which suggests a
fairly definite boundary to the activities denominated "commerce." 115 S. Ct. at 1626-27
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824)). The majority also
showed intense concern over whether the Commerce Clause has any recognizable outer
boundary. Id. at 1632-34. In the end, however, the Court recognized that "the question of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause 'is necessarily one of degree,"' id. at
1633 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)), and con-
cluded that attempts to define the limits of the commerce power yield no "precise formu-
lations." Id. at 1634. These statements are more akin to the fuzzy questions I pose in the
text.
Resolution of Commerce Clause controversies depends, not only on the meaning of
the word "commerce," but on the meaning of "regulate" in the Commerce Clause and
both "necessary" and "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 18. For simplicity, I focus on the word "commerce" in the text. Expanding the
inquiry to the meaning of "regulate," "necessary," or "proper" would not alter the analy-
sis. These terms, like "commerce," denote fuzzy sets. The Supreme Court must consider
historical and normative values, like the ones I describe in the text, to define the breadth
of those terms.
[Vol. 46:685
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answers. Certainly the Commerce Clause does not yield a single,
fixed answer--or, if it does, that answer is inconsistent with the
Constitution's intent to confer limited powers upon Congress. 7
It is possible to identify guideposts for answering these
"fuzzy" questions about commerce. In fact, the Supreme Court has
laid much of the groundwork. Since the New Deal, the Court has
acknowledged that elected legislators, rather than appointed judges,
should set the economic and social goals in a democratic soci-
ety. 8 Congress is also more knowledgeable than the Court about
the economic effects of legislation. 9 A complex modem society,
furthermore, demands national solutions to many problems." All
three of these factors suggest that, as long as Congress says that an
activity is "commerce," the activity does not have to be very much
like commerce to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny.
On the other hand, as Lopez reminds us, both the structure
and text of the Constitution imply some limits on congressional
power.2' Commitment to the values of a federal system conveys
the same message. ' These factors suggest that, although the Com-
merce Clause does not demand much commerce-likeness, it re-
quires something more than zero.
As I noted at the beginning, this is just another way of char-
17. Some scholars have argued that the words of the Commerce Clause define a nar-
row, clearly marked set of activities. Richard Epstein, for example, suggests that "com-
merce" means "shipping and navigation, and the contracts regulating buying and selling."
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1394 (1987). Justice Thomas adopted much the same tone in his concurring opinion in
Lopez. Further examination of Epstein's and Thomas's arguments, however, reveal that
they reject broader definitions of "commerce" for normative reasons: these definitions
would conflict with the Tenth Amendment or structural assumptions of federalism. These
arguments do not rest on the simple assertion that "commerce" is a sharply defined set of
activities. Epstein's final definition of interstate commerce, moreover, is distinctly fuzzy:
"interstate transportation, navigation and sales, and the activities closely incident to them."
Id. at 1454 (emphasis added).
18. See, e.g., Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651-53 (Souter, J., dissenting); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1964); Wickdrd v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
19. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277-80;
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-57 (1971).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122 (1941); NLRB v. Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 59 (1937).
21. 115 S. Ct. at 1626 ("We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers."); see also Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., 301 U.S. at 37 (stating that the scope of Congress's commerce power "must be
considered in the light of our dual system of government").
22. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
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acterizing the Commerce Clause dilemma that Professor Nagel
painted. Rather than seeing two horns of a dilemma, however, I
see hydraulic forces pushing in opposite directions to fix the point
at which the Supreme Court will say, "Yes, this conduct is enough
like commerce that Congress may regulate it."'23
Lopez is quite consistent with the latter view. Possession of a
gun within 1000 feet of a school is, to some extent, commerce. In
fact, like everyone else with perfect hindsight, I'm sure that I
could have won the Lopez case for the Government.24 But this
conduct was less like commerce than any other behavior the Court
had considered in its Commerce Clause rulings: the conduct was
noncommercial, it touched on an area traditionally subject to local
regulation, it occurred outside the workplace, it did not evoke
dangers demanding national control, and Congress had chosen to
regulate the behavior without adopting a jurisdictional element or
making fimdings.' Lopez simply found a point at which the forces
pushing against congressional regulation prevailed, and the Court
said "this isn't enough like commerce for the statute to stand."
I think Professor Nagel's concept of successive validation is
quite helpful in describing both Lopez and other constitutional
decisions. 6 But I would complement that characterization with a
description of Lopez that recognizes the fuzziness of commerce as
a category-and celebrates that fuzziness. We don't need to shrink
from the fact that everything is at least a little bit commerce-like.
We can learn to ask how much an activity must be like commerce
before Congress can regulate it.
The Supreme Court may be stumbling slowly towards that
23. Fuzzy logic cannot determine the exact location of that equilibrium point. Finding
the equilibrium is a normative judgment shaped by factors like the ones described above.
Fuzzy logic is simply a way of characterizing the process by which the Supreme Court
might arrive at that decision.
24. If the Government had discarded its arguments that gun possession in schoolyards
might raise insurance rates or discourage interstate travel-claims that trivialized the Com-
merce Clause with their tenuousness-and had focused on its productivity argument (that
guns disrupt education, thus reducing workforce skills), the Court might have been more
sympathetic to the Government's case. In addition, the Government should have admitted
that the Court had not previously applied the productivity rationale to conduct occurring
outside the workplace, and should have reassured the Justices that this theory could be
narrowly extended to schools because educational institutions bear a unique relationship to
productivity. See Merritt, supra note 3, at 687-89.
25. For further discussion of these and other factors distinguishing the Lopez case, see
Merritt, supra note 3, at 693-712.
26. Nagel, supra note 2, at 652-55.
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question. I disagree with Professor Nagel on a point related to
this.27 I think that the Supreme Court did apply a substantial ef-
fects test in Lopez, but with a different meaning than the one we
had been taught to expect. Most observers, like Justice Breyer,
understood the substantial effects test as a quantitative measure. 8
As long as Congress could point to a dollar effect on commerce
that was "substantial," it could regulate the conduct generating that
effect. Under this quantitative version of the "substantial effects"
test, neither the manner in which the effect was transmitted nor the
length of the causal chain mattered. As long as the conduct had a
"but for" effect on a substantial amount of interstate commerce, the
test was satisfied.
A few Supreme Court opinions used the phrase "substantially
affects" in this manner, 9 but others retained a more complex
meaning of substantiality. These opinions used the phrase "substan-
tially affects" to convey the meaning we ascribe to "proximate
cause" in tort law. The notion of proximate cause asks whether a
defendant's negligence was "close enough" to the plaintiff's injury
to justify shifting the plaintiff's costs to the defendant.3" In the
same way, this second meaning of "substantially affects" asks
whether the conduct is "close enough" to interstate commerce to
justify congressional regulation. Lopez revived this meaning of
"substantial effects" from a long slumber, but the concept had
never entirely disappeared from the Court's jurisprudence.3
27. Nagel, supra note 2, at 651 (arguing that the "substantial effects" test was dis-
cussed in Lopez, but not applied).
28. See, e.g., Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Court believes
the Constitution would distinguish between two local activities, each of which has an
identical [dollar] effect upon interstate commerce, if one, but not the other, is
'commercial' in nature.").
29. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
30. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984).
31. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964) (ex-
plaining that "the determinative test" is "whether the activity sought to be regulated ...
has a real and substantial relation to the national interest"); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 117 (1941) (finding that "the validity of the prohibition turns on the question
whether the employment . . . is so related to the commerce and so affects it as to be
within the reach of the power of Congress to regulate it"); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1937) (recognizing that Congress may regulate activities
that have "a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce," or that enjoy a "close
and intimate relation" to commerce, or that have a "close and intimate effect" on com-
merce).
The most striking analogy between Commerce Clause inquiries and tort notions of
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Once we understand the "substantial effects" test as a limit
akin to proximate cause, it is clear why the Court in Lopez
"pause[d] to consider the implications of the Government's argu-
ments," immediately after announcing this test.32 That is exactly
what judges say in a negligence case when they are about to rule
that the defendant's conduct was not a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. The purpose of proximate cause is to cut off
liability before a defendant becomes responsible for every injury
that can be traced to her conduct.33 The very fact that a plaintiff's
arguments would subject the defendant to liability for every but-for
result of her actions is relevant to the proximate cause inquiry.
In the same way, the purpose of the substantial effects test is
to cut off Congress's power to regulate "commerce" before the
Commerce Clause loses its meaning as an enumerated power. This
meaning of "substantial" includes quantitative effects, but it incor-
porates a host of other factors as well.34 One of those factors is
whether the government's argument is so all-encompassing that it
sweeps all conduct within congressional control.35
I hasten to add that this shift in the meaning of substantial
effects, like the Lopez decision itself, will have very little practical
effect. Lopez says that conduct must be a little more like com-
merce than the acts depicted by the government in that case, but
that isn't saying very much. The Supreme Court has already sent
many signals that Lopez is at or near the high water mark of its
Commerce Clause revival.36 In addition to the cases mentioned by
proximate cause occurs in Justice Cardozo's concurring opinion in A.L.A. Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Cardozo explained,
There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what
is national and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer
rim is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording instruments at
the center. . . .The law is not indifferent to considerations of degree. Activi-
ties local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because of
distant repercussions. What is near and what is distant may at times be uncer-
tain.
Id. at 554. The majority cited this language in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-34, underscoring
the proximate cause nature of its analysis.
32. 115 S. Ct. at 1632; see also Nagel, supra note 2, at 651.
33. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 30, at 273 (explaining that proximate cause refers
"to those more or less undefined considerations which limit liability even where the fact
of causation is clearly established")
34. For further discussion of those factors, as well as the notion of "substantial effects"
as an analog to proximate cause, see Merritt, supra note 3, at 677-82.
35. Merritt, supra note 3, at 685-90, 712.
36. See Merritt, supra note 3, at 728-38 (discussing the future of Commerce Clause
(Vol. 46:685
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Professor Nagel, I would add the extremely cautious concurring
opinion of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor in Lopez,' the
carjacking and arson cases that the Court held pending its Lopez
decision but then declined to remand for reconsideration in light of
Lopez,38 and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, a case decid-
ed just a few months before Lopez in which the Court enforced the
Federal Arbitration Act against a local homeowner. 9 Terminix
provided a much more explosive opportunity to rework the Com-
merce Clause if the Court had wanted to seize it.' But the Justic-
es failed to recognize the opportunity.
In the end, Lopez may tell us more about constitutional theo-
ry, and how the Court interprets constitutional text, than it tells us
about what Congress can regulate. As a practical matter, Lopez has
deprived Congress of very little power.41 Professor Nagel, howev-
jurisprudence as reflected in such recent cases as United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct.
1732 (1995), in which the Court held that an Alaskan gold mine that transported fifteen
percent of its product outside the state was engaged in interstate commerce under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995), discussed infra notes 39-40 and accompanying
text).
Although the courts are unlikely to strike many statutes by holding that under Lopez
Congress lacked a rational basis for concluding that the regulated conduct substantially
affected interstate commerce, other aspects of the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence
may enjoy more vigor. The autonomy principle articulated in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992), constrains congressional power to demand action by state govern-
ments. And the Court's recent application of the Eleventh Amendment in Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), will affect federal court enforcement of
federal statutes against state governments.
37. 115 S. Ct. at 1634 ("The history of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce
Clause ...gives me some pause about today's decision.").
38. See Overstreet v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995); Osteen v. United States,
115 S. Ct. 1825 (1995); Ramey v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995); Moore v. Unit-
ed States, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995). See generally Merritt, supra note 3, at 735-38 (noting
that by denying certiorari in these cases, as opposed to remanding for further consider-
ation, the Supreme Court might have been "content to retreat from the Commerce Clause
once Lopez had been decided").
39. 115 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995).
40. In Terminix, the Court enforced a provision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1994), against a homeowner who purchased services from a local franchise
with interstate connections. From the homeowner's point of view, the transaction was
completely local. A Court intent on restricting the scope of the Commerce Clause might
have used the case to distinguish regulation of businesses operating in interstate commerce
from regulation of customers (especially private homeowners) patronizing those businesses.
None of the Justices, however, expressed any interest in such a distinction. See Merritt,
supra note 3, at 733-35 (concluding that when federal legislation relates to any sort of
commercial activity, the court is unwilling to restrict Congress's expansive legislative
activity).
41. For a detailed analysis of congressional power in multiple settings after Lopez, see
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er, uses Lopez to illuminate one important facet of the Court's
constitutional decisionmaking and I have attempted to provide a
slightly different outlook on that process. That, I suspect, will
constitute Lopez's major contribution: a decision that stimulates
thoughtful judicial and academic commentary on the nature of
constitutional decisionmaking.42
Merritt, supra note 3, at 712-28. As the contributions in this symposium suggest, most
commentators agree that Lopez will invalidate few federal laws. See also Charles Fried,
Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995); Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94
MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Com-
merce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554
(1995). But see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers":
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995); Barry Friedman,
Speech at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium: The New Federalism after
United States v. Lopez (Nov. 10, 1995).
42. In addition to the excellent contributions to this symposium, see Calabresi, supra
note 41; Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the
New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REv. 615 (1995); Fried,
supra note 41; Pollak, supra note 41; H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlim-
ited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1995); Regan, supra note 41.
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